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Underinsurance as Adaptation: Household agency in places of marketization and 
financialization
Abstract
The underinsurance of property is pervasively and persuasively promoted as an indicator of 
risk and riskiness and, in western nations, is assumed to be aligned with socio-economic 
disadvantage. Yet, the solution – in its most simple form, buying more insurance – lacks 
critical interrogation of what the problem actually is. To better understand underinsurance, 
we map house and contents underinsurance across two municipalities and observe that the 
existing delineation of disadvantage and advantage between these two places is muted in 
relation to insurance – underinsurance does not straightforwardly map onto disadvantage. We 
provide an alternative explanation: that underinsurance is not a risk for households per se and 
does not represent riskiness on behalf of these households. Rather it is indicative of 
household agency that produces plac -specified responses within the processes of 
financialization and marketization. We observe that the growth in renting, driven in part by 
housing financialization, is associated with property underinsurance. The history of renting as 
temporary and marginal informs renter decision-making to not insure, and thus, current 
financialized changes in housing co-produce rather than ameliorate underinsurance. We also 
conclude that in negating or resisting insurance marketization, households garner everyday 
financial and material adaptative capacity by underinsuring. 
Keywords
Disadvantage, financialization, housing, insurance, marketization, place, underinsurance
Introduction
All action is collective since it is distributed; what vary are the 
mechanisms for attributing the source of the action (Çalişkan and 
Callon, 2010: 10). 
Underinsurance is understood as having no insurance to cover adverse events or having an 
insurance policy that does not provide adequate coverage. This ‘problem’ of underinsurance 
is gaining prominence, with persuasive arguments for action promulgated by both the 
insurance sector and governments in market-based economies and underpinned by what 
Page 2 of 27
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa
EPA: Economy and Space
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
2
appear to be startling gaps between what is insured and what is deemed insurable. Yet, the 
solution – in its most simple form, buying more insurance – lacks critical interrogation of 
what the problem actually is. Explanations of underinsurance – or identification of 
mechanisms for attributing the source of the problem (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 10) – have 
received little attention. 
In this paper, we examine underinsurance in the context of financialization and marketization 
and, drawing on an empiric of property insurance, pose an explanation emanating the vantage 
point of households. There is a substantial body of work that considers insurance as collective 
or socio-material. Ossandón (2014: 291) observes, for example, that insurance is ‘relational 
work’ and ‘…routinely mixes areas of social life commonly seen as opposing each other’. For 
French and Kneale (2015) insurance manifests ‘bricolage qualities’. It is constituted through 
economic, political, moral and judicial processes (Ewald, 1991; Zelizer, 2017), actuarial and 
non-actuarial ‘calculations’ (Collier, 2008; Ericson and Doyle, 2004; Lehtonen and Van 
Hoyweghen, 2014; Lobo-Guerrero, 2010; McFall, 2015), and the uneven distribution of 
power between insurers and insurees (Lobo-Guerrero, 2014). Insurance is also infused with 
affective promise, drawing together feelings of love, fear and security (McFall, 2011), hope 
(French and Kneale, 2009), trust (Lobo-Guerrero, 2013) and uncertainty, anxiety and distrust 
(Booth and Harwood, 2016). 
The bricolage qualities of underinsurance are less well explored, hence taking direction from 
the introductory quote from Çalişkan and Callon (2010), we approach underinsurance as an 
outcome of processes embodying multiple and entwined human and non-human agencies – it 
is not determined by one form of agency, such as that of the rational individual. Thus, 
manifestations and explanations for underinsurance are inevitably numerous and dependent 
on where, what and whom is the focus of attention. If households, for example, are the focus 
of attention, then agency manifests through the financial, material and householder 
dimensions that constitute the household. 
As we describe below, spurring our interest and focusing our attention in this regard are two 
category errors (re)produced in the universalising association between disadvantage and 
riskiness: The mapping of insurance status onto advantage/disadvantage; and the mapping of 
riskiness onto insurance status. Hence, central to the development of our explanation is the 
placement of underinsurance through mapping, particularly in relation to socio-economic 
indicators of disadvantage. Echoing Hall’s (2010) observation that there is little work into the 
way finance technologies are (re)produced in specific places, French et al. (2011) argue:
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that for the concept of financialization to serve as an effective 
rallying point for researchers working on the social consequences of 
money and finance… and as a means by which to intervene in 
contemporary policy debates, it needs to address a glaring lacuna at 
the heart of the financialization project; that is, its relative uncritical 
approach to the role of space and place within monetary and 
financial processes (French et al., 2011: 805). 
To address this lacuna in the context of underinsurance, we adopt Cameron’s (2007) 
recommendation for the role of human geographers in policy and practice: to match and 
enrich simplified quantitative maps of exclusion and disadvantage, with the ‘critical, 
theoretical and historical complexity’ of a second discursive ‘map’ (Cameron, 2007: 525). In 
this, we employ a mixed methods approach but not one that enacts a conservative politics by 
subordinating the qualitative to the quantitative (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Instead, our 
discussion represents a spatial reality emerging through a dialectic between spatial mapping 
and ideas pertaining to the financialization of everyday life and marketization. Here, we 
understand the former as how ‘households are tied into ever more complicated relationships 
with the international financial system’ (Hall, 2011: 405)i, and the latter, as the process of 
‘gradually expanding the empire of commodities and imposing the financial world’s modes 
of evaluation on more and more sectors of activity’ (Callon, 2016: 17). 
In contributing to a growing body of social science research considering insurance from the 
vantage point of households (e.g. Booth and Harwood, 2016; Lehtonen, 2017), we explain 
underinsurance as a form of household adaptation within context of everyday life. By not 
insuring, households exert agency within the processes of financialization and marketization 
and create non-insurantial opportunities. Rather than the distant, contingent benefit promised 
by insurance (Johnson, 2013), these opportunities (re)produce everyday uncertainty in more 
tangible and negotiable ways. 
Underinsurance
Insurance sector reporting on property underinsurance depicts a significant gap between what 
is insured and what is deemed insurable. The A World at Risk: Closing the insurance gap 
report identifies a global underinsurance gap of US$162.5 billion (Lloyd’s, 2018). 
Developing countries, such as Bangladesh and China account for 96 per cent of global 
underinsurance, and several countries are described as having ‘slipped’ into underinsurance 
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between 2012 and 2018 – Japan, Russia, Sweden and the United Arab Emirates. As well as 
indicating market opportunities for the insurance sector, these levels of underinsurance 
appear to represent a significant financial and social problem. 
However, there is little critical insight into patterns and longitudinal trends that constitute the 
rates of underinsurance reported by the insurance sector (e.g. Lloyd’s, 2018). Rapid 
contextual changes make underinsurance hard to track. Expanding markets in Asia (Sturm 
and Oh, 2010) and the evolution of new insurance technologies and risk modelling (Johnson, 
2014) mean that places, people and things that once lay beyond the reaches of insurance and 
insurers are now insurable. As such, national insurance gap data may appear to describe an 
urgent contemporary issue, particularly considering the rising cost of disasters (de Vet et al., 
2019), but these kinds of underinsurance calculation are about more than identifying a 
problem in need of a solution. These data also represent new forms of knowledge production 
in which the phenomenon of underinsurance is concurrently created and ascertained. 
This (re)production of underinsurance by the insurance sector appears to be reflected (and 
refracted) by governments in market-based economies – sometimes in partnership with 
insurers – looking to address household underinsurance (e.g. State Government of Victoria, 
2019). In the past, not having property insurance was a given and this is still the case in many 
parts of the world. Now, through marketization, more attention is being paid to uninsured 
people and places and there is a concerted effort to problematize this lack through calculation 
and labelling. 
The ‘problem’ of underinsurance is becoming more pronounced in market-based economies 
as it also represents a challenge to securitization. Without insurance, assets are ‘unsafe’ and 
risks ‘unabsorbed’:
At the core of securitisation is a process of risk shifting to 
households, and it is the capacity of households to absorb new 
financial risks that enables both these securities backed by household 
payments to circulate as ‘safe’ assets, and for this safety to give 
finance a material anchoring in social relations (Bryan et al., 2016: 
46). 
Households are being positioned as key players in maintaining global financial stability, both 
in providing their own budget stability and asset security and providing new and growing 
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fixed income streams that can be bundled into securitized financial assets (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2018). 
Situating underinsurance within marketization identifies it as part of networks that are 
arranged through: 
rules and conventions; technical devices; metrological systems; 
logistical infrastructures; texts, discourses and narratives (e.g. on the 
pros and cons of competition); technical and scientific knowledge 
(including social scientific methods), as well as the competencies 
and skills embodied in living beings (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 3). 
The conjoining creation and calculation of underinsurance seeks ‘to make objects incapable of 
expressing novelty or unexpected characteristics that is, to render them passive’ (Çalişkan and 
Callon, 2010: 6). In this, underinsurance is a socio-technical device in pacifying and 
normalising new, and perhaps novel insurance ‘goods’ and markets. In rendering active and 
unbounded relations into discernible and passive goods – in this case, insurance – 
underinsurance is enacted as part of the conception, production and circulation of goods and 
markets. 
As Zelizer (2017) recounts in relation to the emergence of the life insurance industry, insurers 
have long been proactive in creating and maintaining markets and they have mobilised a 
range of devices or actors in this process of marketization. Like strategies in the 1800s that 
mobilised clean cut door-to-door sales men and notions of respectability (McFall, 2011; 
Zelizer, 2017) and actuarial calculations of household structural and moral ‘dangerousness’ 
(O’Malley and Roberts, 2014), underinsurance discourse and associated knowledge 
production contribute to pacifying relations of risk and uncertainty into insurance goods or 
products or, more specifically, extending the insurability of human and non-human entities. 
In this underinsurance itself is not being marketized, rather it is a socio-technical device in 
the processes of insurance marketization. Its current prominence pertains to ‘the collective 
action structured by socio-technical devices and intended to establish successful bilateral 
commercial transactions and to promote their proliferation’ (Callon, 2016: 28). 
As well as acting within marketization, the ‘problem’ of underinsurance also highlights the 
uncomfortable perpetuation of inequality in financializing societies (Leyshon and Thrift 
2007). In western nations, there is a well-established relationship between socio-economic 
status and property insurance uptake. Australians on lower incomes, for example, are less 
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likely to have house and contents insurance (Booth and Tranter, 2018), and in the United 
Kingdom low income has been identified as an indicator of house and contents 
underinsurance (Whyley et al., 1998). For government-sponsored flood insurance that covers 
damage to property in the United States, uptake is positively associated with educational 
attainment (Atreya et al., 2015). Therefore, disadvantaged communities – communities 
identified in terms of higher unemployment, higher low-skilled occupations, lower incomes 
and lower educational attainment (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019) – would appear 
more likely to have higher levels of underinsurance, with underinsurance a ‘problem’ aligned 
with welfare concerns.
Labels like disadvantage and exclusion help give voice to marginalized and poor 
communities (Cameron, 2005). They also create normative categories that can pathologize 
people and places (Cameron, 2007). Being defined in terms of exclusion (financially, socially 
or otherwise) can amount to a characterization of difference, immorality and redundancy, and 
as defining places the inhabitants of which have relinquished their moral obligations for 
competitiveness and consumption (Cameron, 2006). Failure to become a financialized, 
responsibilized subject or community can be equated or conflated with moral deviancy (Pike 
and Pollard, 2010). This is juxtaposed with the mainstream marking of inclusion as 
‘normality, morality, responsibility, independence and competitiveness’ (Cameron, 2006: 
401). 
Previous research demonstrates how easily insurance, or more specifically underinsurance, 
can be mapped onto these normative boundaries. Lo (2013a) identifies social norms and 
expectations as contributing to decisions to insure. Some residents of a wildfire-prone area 
read moral deviancy in those without insurance, describing themselves and familiar 
neighbours as ‘good insured-type people’ (Booth and Harwood, 2016: 50). Other researchers, 
who assume individual rational agency, project a sense of irrationality on those who do not 
insure, inferring a need to discipline such individuals and communities into better behaviour 
(e.g. Block, 2006; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2009). Those without insurance are at risk or are in 
and of themselves risky (O’Malley and Roberts, 2014), and those with insurance are not 
living in risk, or at least living in significantly less risk.
The insurance sector figures for underinsurance introduced above pose an immediate 
challenge to these characterizations. It would be ludicrous to suggest that developing nations 
suffer from collective moral deviancy, and that Japan and Sweden have recently suffered a 
loss in moral fibre. Explanations based on disadvantage status would also be a long bow to 
Page 7 of 27
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa
EPA: Economy and Space
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
7
draw in relation to the 41 per cent of Australian renters without contents insurance (Booth et 
al., 2015), half of residents in the State of Victoria identified as having no property insurance 
coverage or inadequate coverage (State Government of Victoria, 2018), and 82 per cent of 
bushfire-affected households in the Blue Mountains, New South Wales being inadequately 
insured (Legal Aid NSW, 2014). 
These category errors that (re)produce a universalising association between disadvantage and 
riskiness reveal some bricolage qualities of underinsurance, particularly how it is constituted 
within the moral terrains of financialization and marketization. As a socio-technical device 
underinsurance is constituted through powerful insurance ontologies and epistemologies – 
orders of truth and knowledge determined and legitimized by insurers and associated judicial 
and political processes. It embodies everyday qualities of morality and affect: delineating the 
‘good insured self’ from the deviant uninsured self, and evoking uncertainty and 
stigmatization of uninsured places and people. 
A study of middle-class residents in a wildfire-prone area also found that everyday factors 
rather than the more distant machinations of the insurance sector and market contribute to 
insurance decision-making (Booth and Harwood, 2016). For those with property insurance, a 
range of trade-offs inform decision-making. These can involve issues of affordability, 
fulfilling familial expectations, identifying many possessions as irreplaceable, hedging bets 
about likely forms of loss, and uncertainty about insurers coming through as promised. 
Decision-making is ‘momentary rather than monetary; as constituting an entanglement of 
insurantial moments constructed within uncertainty and anxiety, rather than fiscal 
accountancy’ (Booth and Harwood, 2016: 50). For some non-insured residents, insurance is a 
risk in and of itself: a lack of trust of profit-driven insurers and a lack of certainty in the 
capacity of insurance produces a sense of insecurity that some choose to avoid. 
Focusing on the underinsurance bricolage signposts other explanations of underinsurance, 
with a range of factors imbuing household decision-making. It also avoids critiques of 
marketization that represent a ‘tug-of-war’ between freedom and tyranny:
Some argue that marketization allows individuals to escape the 
tyranny and liberticidal constraints of social life. Others maintain 
that by extending the reign of merchandise, marketization leads, on 
the contrary, to the programmed disappearance of community life 
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and solidarity behaviours; on the one hand, freedom, on the other, 
injustice and inequalities (Callon, 2016: 33). 
Neoliberalism more generally does not produce a singular, deterministic reality that invites a 
clear-cut choice between dissent and assent (Williams et al., 2014). Its manifestation is 
spatially and temporally variegated, and produces complexities, contradictions and openings 
that exceed neoliberal aspirations. Through the financialization of everyday life, insurance – 
in theory – should be becoming more normalized. However, 
financialization inevitably fails to live up to its promise to generate 
long-term security – but in doing so the spatial contradictions, 
limitations and discrepancies of financialized capitalism have 
remained much less well explored (French et al., 2011: 808). 
Placing underinsurance through our two-layered mapping (spatial and discursive) provides 
an opportunity to further explore the bricolage qualities of underinsurance, as they manifest 
for households within a specific plac . 
Study area
Our underinsurance empiric is based on the small and adjoining cities of Hobart and 
Glenorchy in Australia’s island state of Tasmania. Our selection of the Glenorchy-Hobart 
area is determined not so much by significance but exemplar. Glenorchy-Hobart area is, by 
and large, ordinary when compared to many other places with an uneven distribution of 
socio-economic advantage and disadvantage. However, the juxtaposition of Hobart – the 
most advantaged municipality in the state, with Glenorchy – one of the more disadvantaged 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019)ii, graphically serves the purpose of this paper.
Tasmania has a population of ½ million, around half of which resides in the Greater Hobart 
region (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Greater Hobart encompasses seven local 
government areas including the cities of Glenorchy and Hobart. Hobart is Tasmania’s capital 
city and covers a land area of 78 km2, with a population of 52,191. It is predominantly 
middle-class, and as a local government area is the state’s least disadvantaged and most 
advantaged area (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Glenorchy covers a land area of 121 
km2 and has a population of 46,790. It’s farming and industrial history defines its working-
class demographic, and out of a total of 29 municipalities, it is the state’s 8th most 
disadvantaged. Its residents are more likely to have lower incomes and educational 
attainment, higher unemployment, and hold unskilled occupations than the other 21 
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9
Tasmanian local government areas, including Hobart (idcommunity, 2018). As illustrated in 
Figure 1 and based on the Index of Relative Socioeconomic Disadvantage (IRSD) (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2019), as well as being distinct in terms of disadvantage status, both 
municipalities include a degree of internal variegation. 
Figure 1. Map of socioeconomic disadvantage in Glenorchy-Hobart.
As measured by the Index of Relative Socioeconomic Disadvantage (IRSD) (Data source: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Each shaded polygon represents a census Statistical 
Area 1 (SA1) unit containing around 150 households.  
In Glenorchy, 63 per cent of dwellings are owner occupied and 34 per cent, rented. In Hobart, 
61 per cent of dwellings are owner occupied and 35 per cent, renters (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2019). These patterns reflect national figures: Australia-wide 62 per cent of 
dwellings are owner occupied and 29 per cent rented. In this context, the insurance of 
property is, by and large, a private affair – there are no national-scale property or disaster 
insurance schemes (McAneney et al., 2016). Governments and non-government organisations 
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10
provide some financial support to households who’s property is impacted by large-scale 
disaster events, but most rely on insurance to recover houses and contents impacted by these 
and other adverse events (de Vet et al., 2019). For homeowners, around 84 per cent for 
Australians have house insurance, 85 per cent, contents insurance, and 79 per cent, both 
house and contents insurance (Booth and Tranter, 2018). For renters, around 60 per cent have 
contents insurance, with the insurance of the buildings the responsibility of landlord-
investors. 
Data and Methods
As previously introduced, house and contents underinsurance can refer to both not having an 
insurance policy and having an inadequate policy. Here we use ‘underinsurance’ as a 
descriptor for not having house and/or contents insurance. To spatially map this 
underinsurance, we began by exploring the relationship between demographic factors and 
insurance status using questions in the 2015 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), 
an omnibus postal survey of Australian adults (Blunsdon, 2016). The 2015 AuSSA used a 
random sample of names and addresses from the Australian Electoral Roll to generate a 
sample that was representative of the Australian population. Each participant was posted an 
explanatory letter, followed by a questionnaire and up to three reminders. 1211 responses 
were received (a response rate of 26 per cent). 
The specific survey question on insurance status was: ‘Thinking about your main place of 
residence, which of the following best describes the type of insurance cover that you or 
someone who lives with you has purchased? The residence is currently covered by … House 
and contents insurance; Contents insurance only; House insurance only; Neither house nor 
contents insurance.’ 
The question that guides our statistical analysis, that will allow us to map underinsurance 
patterns, is: ‘What are the key sociodemographic indicators of property insurance coverage in 
Australia?’ In response to previous findings (withheld for peer review), we examine the 
following hypotheses for higher levels of underinsurance:
(1) Those with lower socioeconomic status
(2) Those who not are married or living with a partner
(3) Younger Australians
(4) Renters
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This previous research has also indicates that living in a large city is significant, but we did 
not examine this as this variable in the AuSSA is self-reported and not able to be 
meaningfully connected to spatial data. 
As insuring property involves two different types of insurance (house and contents) and 
insurance choice and options are influenced by housing tenure (owner occupier and renting), 
we consider contents insurance for renters and house and contents insurance for owner 
occupiers. In other words, both renters and owner occupiers require property insurance to 
recover from adverse events – renting households need contents insurance and owner-
occupied households need house and contents insurance. Since our focus is on the 
(under)insurance of homes as a mechanism for repair and replacement after an adverse event 
rather than comparing across insurance types (i.e. house vs contents), we combine these two 
types for our analysis of underinsurance. 
We developed new models of underinsurance to test our hypotheses, derived from previously 
identified factors driving underinsurance (e.g. withheld for peer review) and that were also 
available in 2016 Australian census data (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The response 
variable selected was a dichotomous variable (1/0) of renters having contents insurance and 
owner occupiers having house and contents insurance, or not having either of these. To test 
the importance of socioeconomic status, predictor variables of having tertiary education, 
having a household income<AUD$650 per week, being employed and having a mortgage 
were used. To test the importance of age, predictor variables of being aged 20–34 and, being 
aged 55+ (with a referent of being aged 35-54) were used. To test the importance of marital 
status, predictor variables of having a spouse and being separated or divorced (with a referent 
of neither being in a live-in relationship nor separated) were used. 
Logistic regressions with a binomial error distribution and logit link function were 
performed, using the glm function in R v3.5.1. Separate models were run testing each 
hypothesis, and a full model including all predictor variables was run. Models were compared 
using Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC), a widely used information theory-based measure 
for comparing the fit of different models that preferences models with fewer predictor 
variables but that retain explanatory power (Burnham and Anderson, 2004). ‘Better’ models 
selected are those with lower AIC values.
To create a spatial map of underinsurance – and given that there is no publicly available data 
on which households have house and/or contents insurance, or not – we developed a method 
Page 12 of 27
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epa
EPA: Economy and Space
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
12
to extrapolate the patterns of underinsurance evident in the AuSSA data. To do this we 
combined the results of the full model of underinsurance with spatially explicit 2016 
Australian census data (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). For this spatial mapping, 
regression coefficients were converted to probabilities by taking the exponent of each 
coefficient to generate the odds ratio, then using the formula probability = odds / (1 + odds). 
For each Statistical Area 1 (SA1) unit (containing approximately 150 households) the 
proportion of residents or households was determined for each predictor variable from raw 
census data (Supplementary material, Table 1).The level of underinsurance (proportion of 
people predicted not to have insurance) was then predicted separately for renters and owner 
occupiers for every SA1, and a single map generated by weighting the predictions by the 
proportion of renters and owner occupiers per SA1.
We acknowledge some limitations with our data, including the lack of data on rental 
properties and house insurance. We do not know if these properties are insured by landlord-
investors or not, and how this may be associated with socio-demographic variables and 
contribute to the mapping. As we conclude below, there is need for more research in this 
regard. 
Results
The results of this study confirmed some of our hypotheses (Table 1). The full model shows 
that people are less likely to be underinsured if they have a spouse (p<0.001, z=-4.5), and 
more likely to be underinsured if they were renting (p<0.001, z=5.3) or had a low income 
(p<0.01, z=3.4). When comparing partial models exploring different hypotheses, the Housing 
Tenure model was the best predictor of underinsurance (AIC=781), closely followed by the 
Marital Status model (AIC=787), then by the Socioeconomics model (AIC=818). Indicators 
of Socioeconomic Status other than income (educational attainment and being employed) 
were not significant in any model. Similarly, the other indicator of Marital Status (being 
separated) were not significant in any model, nor the other indicator of Housing Tenure 
(having a mortgage). While no age variables were significant in the full model of 
underinsurance, being over 55 was a significant (p<0.05, z=-2.5) predictor in the Age model 
(AIC=857). Being aged 20-34 was not significant in any model. Bivariate relationships 
showed similar patterns (Figure 2), although being separated and being aged 20-34 were 
associated with higher levels of underinsurance.
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Table 1. House and contents underinsurance (odds ratios).
Model Full Tenure Socioeconomics Age Marital Status
Renter 4.6*** 6.3*** -- -- --
Mortgage 1.8 1.6 -- -- --
Graduate 0.9 -- 0.9 -- --
Low income 2.6*** -- 3.2*** -- --
Employed 1.0 -- 1.3 -- --
Aged 20–34 0.7 -- -- 1.2 --
Aged 55+ 0.8 -- -- 0.6* --
Spouse 0.3*** -- -- -- 0.2***
Separated or Divorced 1.1 -- -- -- 1.3
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.35 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.16
AIC 677 781 818 857 787
N 962 1066 1039 1083 1062
Notes: ***p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05
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Figure 2. Per cent of households underinsured by social 
background. Standard error bars are shown.
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When these models are combined with 2016 Australian census data to predict underinsurance 
(Figure 3), the clear patterns of disadvantage mapped on to administrative boundaries  appear 
muted (Figure 1). Instead, relatively high levels of underinsurance are evident in the most 
advantaged areas of the City of Hobart, and relatively low levels of underinsurance are 
visible in the most disadvantaged areas of Glenorchy. Instead, the strongest driver of patterns 
appears to be patterns in tenure – renters are much more likely to be underinsured than owner 
occupiers. For example, one SA1 district in Glenorchy (6101505) has a high proportion of 
residents with low incomes (43 per cent), low employment (18 per cent) and a low number of 
university graduates (10 per cent) but also very low predicted levels of underinsurance (16 
per cent). Another SA1 district in Hobart (6102708) has a high level of employment (77 per 
cent), a small number of low-income earners (13 per cent) and a high proportion of university 
graduates (36 per cent), but also a relatively high level of predicted underinsurance (24 per 
cent) (Table 2). 
Figure 3. Map of underinsurance for Glenorchy-Hobart.
Darker shading indicates higher modelled levels of underinsurance. Each shaded polygon 
represents a different census Statistical Area 1 (SA1) unit.
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Table 2. Socio-demographic profile and predicted levels of underinsurance in selected SA1 areas
SA1 6101505 6101412 6103215 6103104 6102708 6101415 6103217 6101909
LGA Glenorchy Glenorchy Hobart Hobart Hobart Glenorchy Hobart Glenorchy
IRSD Decile1 2 6 10 10 6 1 8 1
Population1 312 225 330 303 464 272 459 326
Renters %1 4 4 3 16 57 58 66 67
University 
graduates %1
10 12 50 49 36 4 30 11
Income <AUD$650/wk %1 43 9 8 8 13 40 16 36
In employment %1 18 63 62 57 77 40 47 51
Underinsured % 16 14 14 15 24 31 26 33
1. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019)
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Underinsurance as adaptation
Our spatial mapping demonstrates that underinsurance does not necessarily map onto 
disadvantage – the clear delineation of disadvantage and advantage between Glenorchy and 
Hobart (Figure 1) is muted when mapping underinsurance (Figure 3). This finding confirms 
one of the two category errors that we identified as (re)produced in the universalising 
association between disadvantage and riskiness: there is not a necessary relationship between 
underinsurance and disadvantage. The pattern of underinsurance, when collectivized at the 
level of suburbs, exceeds the moralization and stigmatization constituted within the linking of 
insurance status with disadvantage. In this we do not claim that welfare-oriented concerns 
about underinsurance are unwarranted or false. As our findings show, lower income remains 
a significant factor associated with underinsurance. However, other indicators of 
disadvantage – educational attainment and employment status – are not significant and thus, 
the nature of a socio-economic derived explanation for underinsurance is fallacious. 
Previous references to the place-specificity of property insurance have drawn upon socio-
economic status and how insurance contributes to (re)producing familiar types of 
communities and places – disadvantaged and advantaged. This includes speculation of urban 
‘splintering’ driven by insurance availability – the creation of enclaves of disadvantage and 
wealth in disaster-prone areas (Johnson, 2015), and socio-economic divides being hardened 
through the spatial distribution of underinsurance (Booth and Tranter, 2018). Housing tenure 
has not been considered. However, in our analysis it is housing tenure that is the strongest 
predictor of underinsurance. Renters who do not have contents insurance contribute 
significantly to our mapping of underinsurance, with the even ratio of owner occupiers to 
renters (2:1) across both municipalities an influential factor in the distribution of 
underinsurance. 
In countries like Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, owning a home has 
been both the norm and the ideal (Bate, 2018). This has informed the focus of housing tenure 
research and policy, with ownership receiving far more elucidation, scrutiny and intervention 
than renting: ‘little attention has been given to the cultures and practices of homemaking 
among renters’ (Bate, 2018: 11). Renting has generally assumed to be a temporary and 
marginal occurrence, however recent trends are drawing attention to this tenure type as 
socially and economically significant and influential (Bate, 2018). Over the past decade, in 
Australia, the rental sector has grown by 38 per cent, and 2.1 million households are now 
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renting (Hulse et al. 2018). Households are also now renting for longer (Martin et al., 2018) 
though leases are commonly only 6 or 12 months in duration (Bate, 2018). 
The factors driving the growth in the rental sector in Australia, and in countries like the 
United Kingdom and United States (Bate, 2018), are complex and spatially variagated 
(Martin et al., 2018). The financialization of housing – investment in housing assets as 
privatised welfare and a form of financial security (Aalbers, 2017) – is one significant 
contributor, with ‘middle-Australia’ now possessing an asset base dominated by housing i.e. 
investment properties in the rental market (Bryan and Rafferty, 2018; Gurran and Phibbs, 
2016). However, the imagined security has not been forthcoming. 
Significant income fluctuations are now evident across all socio-demographic bands in 
Australia, and ‘while some live more financially stressed and precarious lives than others, we 
all live on a risk continuum… We are all subject to a range of financial risks…’ (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2018: 103). The wealthiest have greater means to absorb personal or global 
financial shocks, but they are still exposed (increasingly exposed) to financialized risks – 
albeit in different ways and to different degrees to other cohorts. ‘Middle-Australia’ is the 
most exposed to financial stress and risk due to its housing dominated asset base and no 
growth in insurance uptake because of limited discretionary funds (Bryan and Rafferty, 
2018). Low income earners have more diversified assets and contrary to popular perception, 
those that have insurance (of all types) spend more of their income, proportionately, on it. 
They have also significantly increased their insurance commitments over the last decade. 
While this appears largely driven by government incentives for private health insurance 
(Bryan and Rafferty, 2018), it indicates a shift regarding which households have discretionary 
spending power. Low income earners may be more at risk of poverty, but not necessarily of 
financial stress and risk (Bryan and Rafferty, 2018). 
With housing financialization contributing the growth in the rental sector, our findings point 
towards a related growth in underinsurance with many renters choosing not to insure. 
Financialization, as French et al. (2011) observe, inevitably manifests contradictions and 
limitations – in this case, the financialized actions of some co-producing afinancialized 
responses to insurance. This relationship is not linear and causal, with the historic and 
cultural norms that have led to low levels of contents insurance amongst renters dovetailing 
with housing trends to produce a rise in households without property insurance. When renting 
was short term and generally undertaken by people expected to move into home ownership, 
they likely had a low asset base and were thus, low risk should an adverse event impact their 
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possessions. There remains a tendency to assume that renters are low risk; risking a loss of 
limited personal possessions but not the loss of a substantial housing asset (withheld for peer 
review).
Unlike many other western countries where the largest cohort of renters tend to be low 
income earners, Australian renters are evenly spread across all income categories (Martin et 
al., 2018). In addition, Australians identified as not accessing and possessing financial 
services and products such as insurance, include people also distributed fairly evenly across 
educational attainment and income categories, as well as a significant number of people in 
full time employment and a high number of young Australians (mostly not students) (Centre 
for Social Impact, 2014). The exception is those with income less than AU$300 per week 
who are much more likely to not access and possess financial services and products, because 
of financial constraints and perhaps a smaller asset base. There is also little doubt that 
underinsurance – choosing not to purchase house and/or contents insurance – is used by some 
in managing household financial pressures (Booth and Harwood, 2016). This includes these 
lowest income earners and ‘middle Australians’ experiencing financial stress (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2018). 
For renters, and as noted above, the discretionary nature of property insurance can also be 
influenced by a historically constituted sense of transience (Bate, 2018). These households 
may have fewer assets because of frequent moves (note lease length above), and/or devalue 
their possessions when compared to housing assets. Booth and Harwood (2016), for example, 
observe a sense of irreplaceability borne of personal possessions that are hand-me-downs, 
second hand or homemade. While insurers may define these as insurable, some households 
deem these uninsurable i.e. they cannot be replaced because of their sentimental and 
emotional value or are deemed unworthy of financial investment in insurance to ensure their 
replacement. These decisions and the complexity of everyday factors that inform them, 
exceed financialized and marketized logics and capacities. 
More generally, there is also evidence that underinsurance can address the perceived risk of 
being bound and dependent upon insurers and insurance (Booth and Harwood, 2016). High 
levels of distrust in insurers and associated uncertainty about how and if insurance will work 
in the face of an adverse event, means that some achieve a sense of security by not 
purchasing insurance as this negates alignment with untrustworthy insurers. There is also 
evidence that some with adequate wealth and assets to enable recovery independent of 
insurers, chose not to insure (Collins, 2011). 
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Hence, what our research suggests is that rather than (re)producing familiar patterns of socio-
economic disadvantage-advantage, the relationship between housing tenure and insurance 
points towards the emergence of new cohorts that are more or less financialized. Following 
the observation that financialization ‘clearly has the potential to exacerbate unevenness 
across individuals, social groups, and organisations in space and place’ (Pike and Pollard, 
2010: 34), we observe in relation to property insurance, that financialization appears to 
(re)produce responses (for example, to not insure) that are constituting novel places. 
The manifestation of these places disrupts linear and deterministic understandings of 
financialization and the creation of financialized subjects. Households are renegotiating or 
reproducing financialization on their own terms, or at least (re)producing this process in 
relation to other everyday factors that exceed the machinations of global financial systems. 
Financialization is described as ‘“commercially inspired selfhood” that conditions individuals 
to take on greater financial responsibilities and risks’ (Pike and Pollard, 2010: 32) and as 
creating ‘financially self-disciplined subjects’ (French et al. 2011: 804). Here it also includes 
the possibility (the probability) of unconditioned or adisciplined subjectivities. 
While the process of marketization strives to wrestle dynamic relations into passive goods, 
some households exert agency on whether a ‘good’ is recognized as valuable in its pacified 
form. In other words, household-manifest agency that is intended to sustain households (and 
not necessarily markets) embodies financial, material and householder dimensions, and 
brings its own logics and devices to work within the processes of financialization and 
marketization. Underinsured households are not necessarily and inevitably ‘a problem in need 
of a solution’ but can represent a freeing of ‘passive goods’ – of activating rather than 
pacifying relations that can be variously arranged and assembled in other ways, elsewhere. 
Thus, underinsurance constitutes a ‘privileged object for analysing how goods become 
pacified’ (Çalişkan and Callon, 2010: 8) and a privileged object for considering how 
pacification may fail or be resisted. It represents a nexus of resistance or assertion constituted 
within the processes of financialization and marketization; these processes are co-creating 
other non-insurantial possibilities. These possibilities are not necessarily ones premised on 
risk management and can entail their own risks – financial (including a reliance on other 
forms of support if losses are suffered) and moral (as sitting apart from the ‘good insured-
type people’). However, unlike an insurance policy, these possibilities appear likely to 
(re)produce everyday uncertainty in more tangible and negotiable ways. In this, 
underinsurance constitutes a form of adaptation; of households making changes in response 
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to present or future socio-ecological challenges (Biermann, 2015). It is not, in and of itself, 
risky or a representation of riskiness – supporting our observation of the category error of 
mapping riskiness onto insurance status. 
New and evolving insurance technologies are often perceived to enhance the adaptive 
capacities of householders and regions, enabling recovery, incentivising mitigation and 
enabling the stability and growth of financial systems (e.g. Hudson et al., 2016; McGee et al., 
2014; Surminski et al., 2016). In this, adaptation is frequently deployed within a form of 
governance that normalises neoliberalism (O’Hare et al., 2016). Yet, insurance has also been 
identified as contributing to the maintenance of a problematic socio-ecological status quo. It 
co-produces maladaptative responses through, for example, dictating the reconstruction of 
disaster-prone buildings and urban environments rather than enabling rebuilds with mitigative 
capacities (O’Hare et al., 2016). From the vantage point of households, the adaptative 
capacities created by household underinsurance embody afinancialized and amarketized 
logics that are at odds with those constituting insurance as a neoliberal adaptative mechanism. 
In this regard, when it comes in contributing to everyday financial and material adaptation, 
underinsurance appears to hold far more adaptive capacity than insurance. 
Conclusion
The patterns of house and contents underinsurance that we illustrate spatially and discursively 
indicate place-specified responses within the processes of financialization and marketization. 
Households exert agency in deploying underinsurance in response to everyday challenges, 
and underinsurance is not a risk per se for households and does not, in and of itself, represent 
a manifestation of riskiness. Thus, our map of underinsurance is not a ‘risk’ map, but one that 
represents spatially variegated and ‘distinctive ecologies of financial knowledge, practices 
and subjectivities’ (French et al. 2011: 812). 
There is need for greater understanding of the relationship between housing tenure, and social 
and financial security and vulnerability relating to property insurance. This includes further 
investigation of the intersection of the financialization of housing, for which there is a 
substantial body of work (e.g. Aalbers, 2017; Gurran and Phibbs, 2016; Searle and Smith 
2010), and insurance as located within the processes of financialization. As we observe, 
housing financialization is ‘growing’ an afinancialized pattern of underinsurance; property 
underinsurance is co-produced rather than ameliorated through financialization. There is also 
an opportunity to investigate a range of factors in relation to renting and insurance. Despite 
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assumptions of renters as low risk, there are indications that while the risks of underinsurance 
differ between housing type, they are potentially no less significant for renters than for 
owners. Following a disaster event, for example, in addition to a potential loss of contents, 
renters without adequate insurance can face homelessness or having no option but to live in a 
damaged property (withheld for peer review). Avenues of further research on renting and 
insurance include: the place specificity of adverse events and risk perceptions; the 
specificities of different types of property insurance (house, contents and landlord-investor 
insurance, and how contents insurance may differ for owner occupiers and for renters); risk-
related interactions between renters, landlord-investors and property management agencies; 
tenancy laws and contractual factors; the mobility and everyday practices of renters; and, the 
emergence of new technologies in property management. All these warrant closer 
quantitative and qualitative attention that could shed further light on the everyday risks and 
adaptative capacities of households and how these are constituted through insurance. 
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